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FOREWORD
TRIAL BY JURY:
WHY IT WORKS AND WHY IT MATTERS
THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN M. O’MALLEY*
Many members of this court, me included, have written forewords
for this issue of the American University Law Review. We should, given
this issue’s regular focus on the work of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit and the consistently high quality of the issue’s
content. I applaud the Law Review for making publication of this
journal issue an enduring priority, and I commend all who have had a
hand in making it happen.
Previous forewords from my colleagues and I have focused on the
history, formation, and mission of the Federal Circuit, on changes and
challenges it has faced over the years, and on suggestions or concerns for
its future. This year, I want to shift focus. I want to take this opportunity—
this bully pulpit—to address a topic that is important to me: the fact that
patent cases are being used as a vehicle to criticize and chip away at our
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. I am troubled by this trend and
believe we all should be concerned about it—gravely so.

* Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. These
thoughts were first presented in the form of a speech delivered to the New York
University Civil Jury Project and later revised for a presentation to the American
Intellectual Property Law Association. This is an expanded—and more detailed—
version of these earlier remarks. As with all work product coming from my
chambers, I am grateful to my law clerks for their assistance in helping me to
articulate my thoughts on this topic, and to garner support for them. Because this
was a work that developed and changed over time, beginning as a speech and
ending up as this Foreword, I need to thank law clerks from two different terms.
They are Taylor W. King (2016–2017) and Eric D. Dunn (2018–2019).
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I. WHY WE SHOULD CARE
If recent events have taught us anything, it is that we are a deeply
divided country. We have differing views about the direction our
country should take and about what policies are needed to take us
where we want to go. There is also an increasing distrust in the
institutions of government and the ability of those institutions to
protect the rights, liberties, and other values we hold dear. At times
like this, we need reassurance that the judiciary remains an
independent branch of government that stands apart from the two
elected branches, and that the judiciary will protect each of us from
the tyranny of the majority or the whims of the sovereign. While there
are many ways the judiciary can and should provide this reassurance,
one way it must do so is by protecting the sanctity of our right to trial
by jury in all cases, both criminal and civil. This right is a part of what
makes the third branch—the judiciary—independent and unique.
And it is what protects all of us from overreach by the other two
branches of government.
I am an unabashed believer in the jury system, an unabashed
believer that juries take their obligations as jurors seriously, an
unabashed believer that juries can sort out even complex issues when
given the proper tools, and an unabashed believer that juries almost
always arrive at conclusions that are rational, fair, and—even if not the
conclusion I would reach in all cases—justified by the evidence
presented to them and the legal principles they were charged to follow.
I am also an unabashed believer that the right to trial by jury is critical
to our system of justice and the protection of our liberties.
Our Founders were also unabashed believers in the right to trial by
jury.1 In fact, trial by jury was guaranteed by every colony even before
the Constitution and Bill of Rights were adopted.2 England’s
subversion of this right was a principal criticism of the English system
in the colonies. Among other things, the British began to enforce their
unpopular and excessive colonial taxes through courts of equity to
avoid the scrutiny of colonial juries.3 And they sought to exert control
1. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 656 (1973) (“[T]he nascent American nation demonstrated at
virtually every important step in its development that trial by jury was the form of trial
in civil cases to which people and their politicians were strongly attached.”).
2. Id. at 653–54; Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an
Unappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 592 (1993).
3. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 340 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (discussing “[t]he extensive use of vice-admiralty courts by colonial
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over colonial judges and their decision-making by handing control of
judicial salaries to the Crown rather than the colonial legislatures.4
These practices were expressly listed among the “long train of abuses”
committed by the sovereign in the Declaration of Independence.5 The
Constitution’s silence on the right to trial by jury in civil cases triggered
calls for a bill of rights: “[T]he entire issue of the absence of a bill of rights
[from the Constitution] was precipitated at the Philadelphia Convention
by an objection that the document under consideration lacked a specific
guarantee of a jury trial in civil cases.”6 When the call for a bill of rights
was answered, no fewer than three amendments—the Fifth, the Sixth, and
the Seventh—addressed the right to trial by jury.7 And, two more limited
the power of judges, but not juries, in deciding certain issues.8
Trial by jury played such an important role in debates on
independence and ratification because, as Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote, “[t]he [F]ounders of our Nation considered the right of trial by
jury in civil cases an important bulwark against tyranny and corruption,
a safeguard too precious to be left to the whim of the sovereign, or, it
might be added, to that of the judiciary.”9 Thomas Jefferson referred to
trial by jury as “the only anchor, ever yet imagined by man, by which a

administrators to eliminate the colonists’ right of jury trial”); see also Landsman, supra
note 2, at 596; Wolfram, supra note 1, at 654.
4. See Landsman, supra note 2, at 595.
5. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also Parklane
Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 340 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he right of trial by jury was
held in such esteem by the colonists that its deprivation at the hands of the English
was one of the important grievances leading to the break with England.”).
6. Wolfram, supra note 1, at 657; see also Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove &
Robeson, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830) (“One of the strongest objections originally taken
against the [C]onstitution of the United States, was the want of an express provision
securing the right of trial by jury in civil cases.”); Edith Guild Henderson, The
Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 295 (1966) (explaining that
the absence of language regarding civil juries “was a prominent part” of AntiFederalists’ objections to the Constitution); Landsman, supra note 2, at 600
(explaining that seven states only ratified the Constitution on the condition that it be
amended to include a right to trial by jury in civil cases).
7. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1190 (1992).
8. Id. (discussing the Fourth and Eighth amendments); see also Hurst v. Florida,
136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I concur in the judgment here
based on my view that the Eighth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, make
the decision to sentence a defendant to death.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Amar, supra note 7, at 1148–49 (explaining that James Madison originally proposed a
“Fourteenth Amendment” that obligated state governments to provide trial by jury).
9. Parklane Hoisery, 439 U.S. at 343 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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government can be held to the principles of it’s [sic] constitution.”10 And
James Madison called trial by jury in civil cases “as essential to secur[ing]
the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of nature.”11
As the Founders understood, the right to trial by jury operates to
check any temptation the judiciary might have to bend to the will of
either the majority or the sovereign—rather than the law.12 In turn, it
operates to resist any temptation by the other branches of government
to similarly disregard the law for their own ends.13
The Supreme Court has historically recognized the important role
juries play in our system. For example, in Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove
& Robeson,14 Justice Story observed—in 1830—that trial by jury “has
always been an object of deep interest and solicitude, and every
encroachment upon it has been watched with great jealousy.”15 In
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,16 the Court repeated this point one
hundred years later: “Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is
10. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine, 11 July 1789, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0259 (last
visited May 20, 2019).
11. Mark W. Bennett, Judges’ Views on Vanishing Civil Trials, 88 JUDICATURE 306, 307
(2005) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 454 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
12. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 127 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“The Sixth Amendment therefore provided for trial by jury as a ‘double security,
against the prejudices of judges, who may partake of the wishes and opinions of the
government, and against the passions of the multitude, who may demand their victim
with a clamorous precipitancy.’” (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 924, p. 657 (Abr. 1833))); Cheff v.
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966) (requiring jury trials for the imposition of
contempt sentences longer than six months); FEDERAL FARMER: AN ADDITIONAL
NUMBER OF LETTERS TO THE REPUBLICAN, LETTER XV (1788), reprinted in 17 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 265, 339 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1995)
(“If the conduct of judges shall be severe and arbitrary, and tend to subvert the laws,
and change the forms of government, the jury may check them, by deciding against
their opinions and determinations, in similar cases.”); Jenny E. Carroll, The Jury’s
Second Coming, 100 GEO. L.J. 657, 668–75 (2012) (discussing the history of jury
nullification in colonial America).
13. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 824 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“The power to acquit is as decisive as the power not to
prosecute . . . .”); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 55 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)
(“Congress has no more constitutional power to tell a jury it can convict upon any such
forced and baseless inference than it has power to tell juries they can convict a defendant
of a crime without any evidence at all from which an inference of guilt could be drawn.”).
14. 28 U.S. 433 (1830).
15. Id. at 446.
16. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial
should be scrutinized with the utmost care.”17
Indeed, respect for trial by jury is built into both the rules of civil
and criminal procedure and into basic principles of appellate review.
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, only
permits a court to set aside a jury verdict where the court concludes
that “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary
basis” to reach the conclusion it did.18 There is no “exception” to Rule
50 for complex civil cases, such as patent cases, just as there is no
“exception” for patent law in other rules that direct appellate courts to
respect factual findings by a district court judge.19 Other principles of
appellate review, while not spelled out by rule, also require respect for
fact-finders like juries. Thus, appellate courts may not consider
evidence not included in the record below,20 may not address an issue
raised for the first time on appeal,21 may not make credibility
determinations,22 and may not reweigh the facts underlying express or
implied factual determinations made in the trial court.23 These
restrictions on the appellate function, backed by years of precedent,

17. Id. at 501 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1).
19. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837 (2015)
(explaining that an appellate court’s role is to “accept a district court’s findings unless
clearly erroneous”).
20. See, e.g., Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting the
limited exceptions to this general principle); Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon (New York),
807 F.2d 1150, 1165 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The only proper function of a court of appeals is to
review the decision below on the basis of the record that was before the district court.”).
21. See, e.g., Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 473 (2012) (“For good reason,
appellate courts ordinarily abstain from entertaining issues that have not been raised
and preserved in the court of first instance.”); McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d
13, 22 (1st Cir. 1991) (“It is hornbook law that theories not raised squarely in the
district court cannot be surfaced for the first time on appeal.”).
22. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility
determinations . . . are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . .”); Ondato v. Standard
Oil Co., 210 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1954) (“The books are full to repletion with declarations
that the credibility of witnesses is for the jury; it would be idle to pile up citations, which
in addition to those we have mentioned, have repeated the doctrine.”).
23. See, e.g., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (“[T]he weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge . . . .”).
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are predicated on the importance of respecting the trial court’s role in
the judicial process and particularly the role of the jury as factfinder.24
Despite our nation’s long history of respect for the right to trial by
jury, many now argue that it is time to do away with jury trials in patent
cases. I have heard a number of arguments in support of this
contention. I will focus here on only three: (1) the assertion that there
should be a “complexity exception” to the Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial; (2) the claim that juries are incapable of understanding
the factual and legal complexities in patent cases; and (3) the
contention that the formation and existence of the Federal Circuit
signaled a congressional desire to treat patent cases differently than other
civil cases and to eschew jury findings in the interest of “uniformity” in
patent law. I reject all three contentions without hesitation.
II. A COMPLEXITY EXCEPTION
Some scholars have suggested that trial by jury is neither appropriate
nor required in complex civil cases.25 And some justices and judges
have begun to suggest that they may be right.26 Not only do I reject the
notion that the Seventh Amendment’s command is an optional one, I
also see no need for a “complexity exception” and fear the implications
for our system of justice if we were to adopt one.

24. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 340–41 (1949) (Jackson, J.)
(“The judgment below is supported by an opinion, prepared with obvious care, which
analyzes the evidence and shows the reasons for the findings. To us it appears to
represent the considered judgment of an able trial judge, after patient hearing, that the
Government’s evidence fell short of its allegations—a not uncommon form of litigation
casualty, from which the Government is no more immune than others.”); Fairmount
Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 485 (1933) (Brandeis, J.) (“Appellate
courts should be slow to impute to juries a disregard of their duties, and to trial courts a
want of diligence or perspicacity in appraising the jury’s conduct.”).
25. See Jay Tidmarsh, The English Fire Courts and the American Right to Civil Jury Trial,
83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1893, 1901 n.33 (2016) (collecting articles debating the issue); see
also Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. et al., A Bicentennial Transition: Modern Alternatives to
Seventh Amendment Jury Trial in Complex Cases, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 62 (1988)
(suggesting juries be eliminated in complex cases).
26. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 545 n.5 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(“Certainly there is no consensus among commentators on the desirability of jury trials
in civil actions generally. Particularly where the issues in the case are complex—as they
are likely to be in a derivative suit—much can be said for allowing the court discretion to
try the case itself.”); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1087–88
(3d Cir. 1980) (discussing benefits of denying jury trials in complex cases).
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American jurors have historically been called upon to decide
complex cases, including those involving detailed scientific inquiry.27
The Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence,
compiled along with the National Academies of Sciences, reflects the
broad range of scientific issues presented in all manner of federal cases
today—both criminal and civil.28 There is little evidence the practice
was much different in eighteenth-century England.29 And, the Supreme
Court has shown no willingness to find a “complexity exception” based
on the text of the Seventh Amendment or its historical underpinnings.30
For good reason.

27. See, e.g., Sartor v. Ark. Nat. Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1944) (reversing
the grant of summary judgment in a complex natural gas case since the credibility and
weight of the evidence that should “be determined, after trial, in the regular manner”);
Travelers’ Indem. Co. v. Parkersburg Iron & Steel Co., 70 F.2d 63, 65 (4th Cir. 1934)
(“Questions of fact are questions for the jury; and they do not become questions for
the court merely because their solution may require scientific knowledge or expert
opinion.”); Casey v. Nat’l Union, 3 App. D.C. 510, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1894) (“[T]he
evidence offered to overcome [plaintiff’s] prima facie case was of a nature to be
susceptible of much argument and scientific scrutiny. This defensive evidence was of
a nature to be urged with more or less effect with the jury, as they should believe in
the skill and accuracy of judgment of the physicians who had testified; and the jury
could not be deprived of their right thus to weigh and scrutinize the testimony.
Testimony of the nature and character of that given in this case, is especially required
to be passed upon by the jury.”).
28. See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (3d
ed. 2011).
29. See JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLOAMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 21 (2006) (“No case in late-eighteenth-century England is
known where the plaintiff sued at common law for damages, . . . yet the common-law
court decided the factual issues were beyond the jury’s capacity, causing the court to
send the case to Chancery.”); Tidmarsh, supra note 25, at 1902 (noting that the
historical record is, at best, “indeterminate” on the issue). But see Patrick Devlin, Jury
Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 43, 44–57 (1980) (examining how equity courts were used in the eighteenthcentury to handle “issues . . . of such complexity that a jury at that time would have
been unlikely to understand them”); James Oldham, On the Question of a Complexity
Exception to the Seventh Amendment Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1031, 1033–
35 (2010) (noting that some complex litigation was sent to the English Court of
Chancery with no trial by jury).
30. See, e.g., Curriden v. Middleton, 232 U.S. 633, 636 (1914) (“[M]ere
complication of facts alone and difficulty of proof are not a basis of equity
jurisdiction.”); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (1989)
(explaining that “the practical abilities and limitations of juries” is not a factor in
considering whether a claim must be tried to a jury or not (quoting Ross v. Bernhard,
396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970))).
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In my years on the district bench, I presided over cases where juries
deliberated on matters relating to diverse categories of scientific and
complex financial evidence. After every jury trial over which I presided,
I spoke to the jury at length—to thank the jurors, to answer questions
they might have about the process, and, importantly, to help educate
myself and the lawyers about jury dynamics and their deliberative
processes. I was always impressed by how thoughtful and careful the
jurors were, how objective and logical their analysis was, and by the level
of detail at which they were willing to engage. In one highly complex
case involving multiple experts and a large volume of exhibits, the jury
told me that they agreed to spend the first two full days of deliberations
silently going through every piece of evidence, their own notes, and the
jury instructions I had given them to assure that, once an interactive
dialogue began, it would be one that was fully informed.
While my sixteen years of experience presiding over jury trials is only
anecdotal, it is consistent with studies showing that juries, on average,
tend to reach reasoned conclusions.31 If two minds are better than
one, nine or twelve are better still. This sentiment—that jurors
working collectively mostly get it right even in complex cases—is
shared by most district court judges around the country.32 As District
Judge William Young recently recounted in a ruling rejecting the
contention that juries are ill-equipped to decide whether to pierce the
corporate veil: “It takes a special type of arrogance simply to conclude
that American jurors cannot handle” complex issues involving patent

31. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A
Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 485–86 (2005) (noting that studies
show judges and juries, on average, tend to reach similar outcomes); Neil Vidmar &
Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1166–67
(2001) (“Although jurors struggle and are occasionally misled, they generally make
reasonable use of complex material, utilizing the expert testimony when it is presented
in a form that they can use.”).
32. E.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Francis Doorley, What a (Very) Smart Trial Judge
Knows About Juries, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 373, 374 (2015) (examining Judge Jack
Weinstein’s “deep appreciation for the jury’s abilities and performance”); Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1066–67 (1964)
(“[A]lthough the trial judges polled gave a wide variety of explanations for the cases
in which there was disagreement [between the judge and jury], they virtually never
offered the jury’s inability to understand the case as a reason.”); see also Sonia
Sotomayor, Remarks at New York University Law School (Feb. 8, 2016),
http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/sonia-sotomayor-supreme-court-annual-survey-americ
an-law-civil-jury-project (commenting that as a district court judge, she often reached
the same conclusions as the juries in “technically difficult cases”).
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rights, constitutional rights, or antitrust law.33 There is no reason to
abandon the Seventh Amendment because a case presents complex
issues, nor—in my view—is there a better alternative available if we
choose to do so.34
III. JURIES IN PATENT CASES
Although juries often decide complex cases, patent lawyers still insist
that juries do not understand their cases.35 But patent cases are no
more complex than those involving toxic torts, aviation disasters,
securities fraud, Ponzi schemes, antitrust conspiracies, or even
criminal matters with multiple defendants and complex forensic
science. I place fault for a less-than-perfect experience with juries in
patent cases not at the feet of jurors or the system for trials our Founders
created, but at the feet of trial judges, advocates, our court, and,
recently—and perhaps most disappointingly—the Supreme Court.
Trial judges and advocates together can improve juror decisionmaking in patent cases in a number of ways.36 I will mention only a
few. First, early and continued case management by trial courts, with
willing input and cooperation from counsel, can narrow and clarify
questions that must be put to the jury. Second, advocates can engage in
targeted discovery with an eye toward what they or their opponent will

33. Marchan v. John Miller Farms, Inc., No. CV 3:16-00357-WGY, 2018 WL
6518660, at *6–7 (D.N.D. Dec. 11, 2018) (“Four months ago, I watched a jury learn
about the mechanics of 3-D printing and analyze a certain interface layer at the
microscopic level to determine obviousness and infringement. More recently, I
watched a jury determine probable cause to remove an obstreperous passenger from
a campus shuttle bus. I asked another jury this question: ‘Did the anticompetitive
effect of [a] settlement [between two pharmaceutical companies] outweigh any
procompetitive justifications?’ Jurors have long been deciding all these issues and
many more complex. It takes a special type of arrogance simply to conclude that
American jurors cannot handle the veil-piercing issues presented here.” (alterations
in original) (internal citations omitted)).
34. Id. at *6 (rejecting the notion that judges are better equipped than juries to
decide certain issues because “anything a judge can do a jury can do better”); see also
Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 38 (2001) (“[M]ost criticism focuses on the inability of lay juries to
comprehend technically complex patent cases. Little attention and no empirical study
has dissected or analyzed whether district court judges are the appropriate alternative.”).
35. Paul R. Michel & Dr. Michelle Rhyu, Improving Patent Jury Trials, 6 FED. CIRCUIT
B.J. 89, 90–91 (1996).
36. See Tom M. Dees, III, Juries: On the Verge of Extinction? A Discussion of Jury Reform,
54 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1771 (2001) (commenting that judges and lawyers are
responsible for educating the jurors to enable them to intelligently reach a decision).
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really need to prove once trial arrives. That will cause counsel to narrow
their focus early and not be tempted to take juries down rabbit holes.
Once trial does arrive, trial judges can employ jury questionnaires
before in-person voir dire begins, allow jurors to take notes, guard
against disjointed or repetitive presentations of proof, require counsel
to clarify matters where the possibility for confusion seems obvious,
and encourage the use of technology in trial presentations. Trial
judges can also provide jury instructions in understandable prose
rather than legalese, ensure that each juror has a copy of those
instructions with them in the jury room, and insist on verdict forms
that provide jurors with an understandable decision tree to protect
against inconsistent or incomprehensible verdicts.
Finally, trial judges should avoid the use of arbitrary time limits that
may make it impossible to explain matters adequately to the jury.
While time limits are important to impose discipline on the process,
what those will be in a given case should depend upon the issues to be
decided, the nature of the technology involved, and other case-specific
circumstances. Jurors cannot be expected to understand what advocates
lack the time to explain. Of course, to do all this, judges need the tools
and resources necessary to manage jury trials amid their ever-growing
dockets. While critics are quick to complain about the way judicial
officers handle complex cases, it remains true that trial court chambers
are woefully understaffed—with only two law clerks each—and there are
simply too few trial judges authorized for many judicial districts, and too
many court vacancies allowed to languish unfilled.37
At trial, advocates can refrain from trying to prove—to the jury,
judge, their clients, their opponents, or even themselves—that they
know more about the relevant science than anyone in the room. They
can do what litigators who try all manner of cases to juries do: convey
to the jurors just that level of scientific information necessary to their
decision-making. In my experience, when jurors get confused about
science, technology, economics, or accounting, it is usually because the
advocates create the cause for confusion. Patent lawyers tend to
overthink and over-present their cases. They need to be tight and
succinct in their presentations, use courtroom technology to their
advantage, and cross-examine the opposing expert the way they would
cross-examine a hostile witness in a car accident case, rather than
37. See Courts Need New Judgeships, Judicial Conference tells Congress, U.S. COURTS (June
21, 2018), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2018/06/21/courts-need-new-judgeshipsjudicial-conference-tells-congress.
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engage in high-level debates over scientific theory. And, they need to
make sure to proffer evidence on every fact or legal element they need
to prove or disprove, and ensure the evidence gets admitted over the
objections that are bound to come. Jurors should not be asked to fill
gaps in counsel’s presentations or be asked to find for a party on
elements of a thin case that are left unproven. Advocates also need to
couch their arguments in understandable terms; in ways that walk the
jury through the jury instructions, and ultimately, lead the jury to the
desired conclusions on the verdict form.
Rather than continue the mantra that patent cases are just too
different from other cases to allow them to go to a jury, advocates need
to stop treating patent cases as different and use good, solid triallawyering skills to educate and persuade the juries they encounter. If
they do this, well-instructed jurors usually will reach the right result.
As then-Chief Judge Howard Markey wrote in 1985: “There is no
peculiar cachet which removes ‘technical’ subject matter from the
competency of a jury when competent counsel have carefully
marshalled and presented the evidence of that subject matter and a
competent judge has supplied carefully prepared instructions.”38
But responsibility for the problems arising in the use of juries in
patent cases does not end with trial judges or trial lawyers, it includes
appellate courts as well. When appellate courts show a lack of respect
for jury verdicts and fail to give adequate deference to jury factual
findings—and the implications of those factual findings—the ripple
effect is devastating. Trial judges become incentivized to take
questions away from juries whenever possible, fearing that the hard
work in supervising a jury trial is a vain exercise. Advocates have less
incentive to explain things clearly for the jury because they begin to
believe they are playing to a different audience—one who believes it is
the first-instance fact-finder because it somehow has a better ability to
grasp or understand the issues at hand.39 This undermines confidence
in jury verdicts and multiplies appeals. As Judge Pauline Newman said

38. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(en banc) (citations omitted).
39. See, e.g., Ted D. Lee and Michelle Evans, The Charade: Trying a Patent Case to All
“Three” Juries, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 4 (1999) (explaining that lawyers for patent
holders have to argue to three “juries,” including the traditional jury, the trial judge,
and the Federal Circuit); Gregory D. Leibold, Comment, In Juries We Do Not Trust:
Appellate Review of Patent-Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 646 (1996)
(arguing that de novo claim construction review means “a plaintiff will have to win two
trials—one in district court and one in the CAFC”).
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in her dissent in Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc.40: “When the
relationship between trial and appellate tribunals is distorted, the
consequences disserve the public and the courts.”41
We on the Federal Circuit have been criticized for weakening the
jury function and causing dysfunction in the system in the process.
Rooklidge and Weil used the phrase “judicial hyperactivity” to describe
our court’s alleged penchant for “usurp[ing] elements of the decisionmaking process that are supposed to be the province of the lower
courts, administrative bodies, or even litigants.”42 Writs of certiorari in
patent cases now often contain, as one of the principle objections,
complaints about our court’s supposed failure to recognize the limits
of our appellate function and our willingness to usurp the province of
the trial court, the jury, or both.43
Recent Supreme Court cases have also tended to sideline juries.
Whether this means permitting district court judges to dismiss cases that
do not seem “plausible”44 or to resolve cases without “genuine”45 factual
disputes, in the words of one commentator: “Pretrial procedure has
become nontrial procedure by making trial obsolete.”46 And the
Supreme Court has questioned the jury’s ability to decide certain complex

40. 952 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
41. Id. at 1332 (Newman, J., dissenting).
42. William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Federal
Circuit’s Discomfort with its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 727 (2000).
43. Id. at 727–28.
44. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
45. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (“The inquiry
performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a
trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can
be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor
of either party.”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–
86 (1986) (“To survive petitioners’ motion for summary judgment, respondents must
establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact . . . .”); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“[S]ummary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’”).
46. John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE
L.J. 522 (2012); see also Adam N. Steinman, The Rise and Fall of Plausibility Pleading?, 69
VAND. L. REV. 333, 389–90 (2016) (showing that the Supreme Court cases most often
cited by federal courts are Anderson, Matsushita, Celotex, Twombly, and Iqbal).
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issues in patent cases.47 Whatever the merits of these Supreme Court
decisions, their effect—to downplay the jury function—is apparent.
I believe we all should strive to respect the role of juries in all cases,
including patent cases. Where inefficiencies are perceived, we should
exercise care in where we place the blame and with respect to “fixes”
we propose. All participants in the process can do more to improve
the quality of jury verdicts. In my view, neither the jurors themselves
nor the jury system are the problem.
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND JURIES
Nothing about the existence or formation of the Federal Circuit alters
my view that jury trials are an important aspect of the adversarial process
in patent cases or that our court is obligated to treat those verdicts with
the same deference that other circuits must afford verdicts in all cases.
The Federal Circuit was formed in 1982 to address a perceived lack
of uniformity in the enforcement of patent rights.48 Congress felt that
a lack of consistency in how the patent law was interpreted and applied
endangered innovation by making it difficult to rely predictably on the
rights patents conveyed.49 But the Federal Circuit is still an Article III
court governed by the same rules and decisional paradigms that govern
every other Article III court, populated by generalist judges, with a
broad jurisdictional reach. Congress did not charge the Federal Circuit
with deciding whether the patent system should promote innovation, or
competition, or access to lower cost medical supplies; it charged the
Federal Circuit with applying the law to the cases before it. And
Congress did not free the Federal Circuit from the obligation to abide
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or those constitutional and
common law principles that govern and guide all federal courts of
47. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (“So
it turns out here, for judges, not juries, are the better suited to find the acquired
meaning of patent terms.”).
48. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989)
(“Congress conferred exclusive jurisdiction of all patent appeals on the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in order to ‘provide nationwide uniformity in patent
law.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981))).
49. See, e.g., Senator Robert J. Dole, Remarks at The Ninth Annual Judicial
Conference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (May 25, 1982),
reprinted in 94 F.R.D. 347, 355 (1982) (“Patent litigation appeals take years and the
average cost, according to some statistics, is around $250,000. It seems to me that we
must have a more predictable and more uniform judicial environment to enable
inventors, investors, and businesses to feel secure with the exclusive property rights
they supposedly obtain with a patent.”).
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appeals. Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear in numerous
cases over the years that neither the character of patent law nor the
unusual character of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction frees the Federal
Circuit from its Article III mantle.50
Moreover, the “uniformity” Congress hoped the Federal Circuit
would ensure was not one Congress meant to foster by placing patent
law in the hands of a narrow set of decision-makers.51 Instead,
Congress hoped uniformity would be borne of having a single
appellate court review the decisions of all lower tribunal decisionmakers with the same deference those decision-makers have always
been due.52 In other words, Congress hoped uniformity would grow
out of the exercise of our traditional adjudicative function, applied to
cases arising nationwide. Ultimately, we must accept the fact that
patent cases are but one type of civil case arising in the federal system,

50. See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016)
(overruling the Federal Circuit’s test for damages under the Patent Act because it
“unduly confine[d] the ability of district courts to exercise the discretion conferred on
them”); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836 (2015) (finding that
Rule 52(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies equally to patent cases);
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 560 (2014) (holding
that all appellate courts are required to review district courts’ 35 U.S.C. § 285
determinations under the abuse of discretion standard); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S.
251, 256 (2013) (interpreting the district court’s original jurisdiction as the same
under for general jurisdiction cases and patent cases); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (emphasizing that a district court’s equitable
discretion “must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent
disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards”).
51. See, e.g., Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit—A Reminiscence, 14 GEO. MASON
U. L. REV. 513, 520 (1992) (explaining that Congress incorporated other areas of law
into the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to “avoid the risks of specialized courts”).
52. Compare Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d
1272, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (concluding that claim construction should
be reviewed de novo in part because Federal Circuit was created to achieve
uniformity), judgment vacated sub nom. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Universal
Lighting Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015), with Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 837, 839–40
(stating that “[e]ven if exceptions to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6)] were
permissible, we cannot find any convincing ground for creating an exception to that
Rule here,” and noting that the need to bring about uniformity does not overcome the
clear text of Rule 52); see also S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 (“The establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit also provides a forum that will increase doctrinal stability in the field of patent
law.” (emphasis added)); H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981) (“[T]he central purpose
[of the Federal Circuit] is to reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty
of legal doctrine that exist in the administration of patent law.” (emphasis added)).
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with all its historical strengths and weaknesses, including resort to jury
trials where appropriate.
V. FINAL THOUGHTS
In closing, there are two additional points I want to emphasize. First,
virtually no other country employs jury trials in any civil context, and
none afford jury verdicts the respect we do.53 While international
uniformity in patent law has some appeal, we cannot ignore that our
Founders felt the right to a trial by jury in both criminal and civil cases
should be enshrined in our Bill of Rights. This sets us apart from the
rest of the world in what I believe are positive ways. It reflects perhaps
the most important protection for individuals against the will of the
sovereign and the whims of the majority who might elect that
sovereign. Chipping away at the right to trial by jury in any context
seems ill-advised, but it is particularly true in the context of intellectual
property rights—rights recognized explicitly in the U.S. Constitution.54
Second, and finally, participation in the jury system is often the only
contact with the justice system or the federal government that many
citizens ever have. It is a rare opportunity for individuals—whatever
the circumstance of their birth or their station in life—to participate
in our democracy. It reinforces a fundamental belief in those called
to serve that we are all created equal and assures citizens that in our
society even the powerful and wealthy are subject to the scrutiny of
average citizens. And, perhaps nearest and dearest to my heart, jury
trials foster trust in, and respect for, the justice system. When I had the
privilege of presiding over jury selections, I was disheartened by how
many people felt it would be a waste of their time to participate in the
process. But my faith in the citizens of our communities was always
renewed when—without fail—even those who had tried to avoid jury
duty, later told me it had been a valuable and educational experience.
We should avoid letting the temptation to streamline patent cases
prompt the adoption of practices that harm our system of justice or
further weaken citizens’ faith in the judiciary. As Judge Young asked
in Marchan v. John Miller Farms, Inc.: “Do you care about any of this?
You should. Your rights depend on it.”55 My sentiments exactly.

53. Valerie P. Hans, Jury Systems Around the World, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 275,
280–84 (2008).
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
55. No. CV 3:16-00357-WGY, 2018 WL 6518660, at *8 (D.N.D. Dec. 11, 2018).

